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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v. 
RODNEY DONALD CARTER, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 900303-CA 
Category No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for possession of a 
controlled substance with the intent to distribute, a second 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) 
(1990), in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake 
County, the Honorable Michael R. Murphy, presiding. This Court 
has jurisdiction to hear the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2a-3(2)(f) (1990). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD 
OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court 
correctly denied defendant's motion to suppress evidence, ruling 
that defendant knowingly and voluntarily consented to the search 
of his person and luggage until police officers had reasonable 
and articulable suspicion that defendant was involved in a crime. 
Because of the trial court's advantageous position in determining 
the factual basis for a motion to suppress, this Court will not 
reverse the trial court's factual evaluation unless its findings 
are clearly erroneous* State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 327 (Utah 
Ct. App.), cert, granted, P.2d (Utah 1989). However, in 
assessing the trial court's legal conclusions based upon its 
factual findings, this Court applies a correction of error 
standard. Id. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
U.S. Const. Amend. IVx 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Rodney Carter, was charged with possession 
of a controlled substance with the intent to distribute, a second 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) 
(1990) (R. 6). Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence 
seized after a warrantless search of his person (R. 24). Upon 
the trial court's denial of defendant's motion, defendant entered 
a plea of not guilty. Defendant was convicted on March 20, 1990 
after a bench trial and on May 6, 1990, was sentenced to a term 
of one to fifteen years in the Utah State Prison. The sentence 
was suspended in lieu of thirty-six months probation under the 
supervision of Adult Probation and Parole (R. 130, 142). 
o 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On July 17, 1989 Detective Bart Palmer of the Salt Lake 
County Sheriff's Office and Lieutenant David Fullmer of the Utah 
State Narcotics Agency were observing airline passengers at the 
Salt Lake International Airport in an effort to locate drug 
couriers (transcript of October 18, 1989 deposition of Detective 
Palmer, page 1 [hereinafter "PT."]; transcript of October 18, 
1989 deposition of Lieutenant Fullmer, page 1 [hereinafter 
"FT."]; and transcript of November 11, 1989 hearing on 
defendant's motion to suppress evidence, pages 36-37, 57 
2 [hereinafter "Tr."]). 
At approximately 5:15 p.m. Palmer and Fullmer were both 
observing passengers as they deplaned from an America West flight 
originating in Los Angeles and arriving in Salt Lake City via Las 
Vegas (Tr. 4, 37, 67; PT, 1), Defendant Rodney Carter was among 
the passengers on that plane and was carrying a duffle bag (Tr. 
7, 43; PT. 14-15). As defendant deplaned and entered the 
concourse, both officers noted that he scanned the area and crowd 
but did not appear to be looking for anyone in particular or 
reading the signs for directions (Tr. 38; PT. 1; FT. 1). 
Defendant then turned and walked up the concourse, past a bank of 
pay telephones (Tr. 41). As defendant walked up the concourse, 
Although the State will summarize the facts as attested to by 
the testimonies of all witnesses, defendant does not challenge 
any of the trial court's findings of fact, in which, inter alia, 
the court found the police officers' testimonies more credible 
than defendant's testimony. 
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The transcribed depositions of Fullmer and Palmer were made 
part of the record by stipulation (Tr. 3; R. 122). 
he looked back over his shoulder in the direction of the officers 
three times (Tr. 38-39; PT. 1; FT. 1). Both Fullmer and Palmer 
decided to continue observing defendant, but they briefly lost 
visual contact with him as he rounded a turn (Tr. 39). 
Defendant then went to a bank of pay telephones at the 
top of the concourse. Fullmer walked past defendant toward an 
escalator, and Palmer went to the telephone cubicle next to 
defendant (Tr. 39, 67-68; PT. 1-2; FT. 2-3). Defendant was in 
the telephone area only momentarily, and neither officer could 
hear him speak to anyone (Tr. 40, 68; PT. 10-11). Defendant 
apparently tried unsuccessfully to call his wife (Tr. 6, 40, 69). 
After hanging up the phone, defendant walked to the 
terminal escalator leading to the lower level (Tr. 7, 40; PT. 2; 
FT. 4). Once defendant was on the escalator, he quickened his 
pace and began to rapidly walk past other people (Tr. 40; PT. 2; 
FT. 4). Defendant continued to walk at a fast pace and quickly 
exited the terminal without stopping by the baggage claim area 
(Id.). Palmer had to run in order to keep pace with defendant, 
who exited the terminal and went to the taxi cab stand just 
outside the main terminal doors (Tr. 7, 40, 42; PT. 2). Palmer 
and Fullmer conferred briefly as they approached the terminal 
doors and determined that they wanted to "contact" defendant 
3 
before he left the premises (FT. 5-7). Fullmer went out the 
northern doors of the terminal, and Palmer went out the doors 
Fullmer explained at the hearing that when an individual is 
"contacted," the officer merely asks "permission to discuss 
things with the individual, and they have to agree" before the 
officer continues the discussion (Tr. 92). 
through which defendant had exited (FT. 6). 
Palmer approached defendant as he was preparing to 
board a taxi, identified himself as a police officer and asked 
defendant if he "would mind talking" to him for a moment (Tr. 44, 
98; PT. 2, 17, 18). Defendant responded, M[s]ure," and removed 
his bag from the back seat of the taxi (Tr. 8-9, 44). Palmer 
asked defendant if he could see his plane ticket (Tr. 9-10; PT. 
2, 19). Defendant responded that he thought he had left his 
ticket on the airplane but looked in his carry-on bag and 
produced an old America West ticket dated July 15, 1989 (Tr. 10, 
43; PT. 2, 19-20). Defendant handed the ticket to Palmer, who, 
after noting it was under the name "Warren Carter," handed it 
back to defendant (Tr. 52; PT. 2, 19-20). 
At about that point, Fullmer arrived near the scene and 
could see Palmer and defendant standing near the open back door 
of the taxi cab (Tr. 69; FT. 7). As Fullmer approached, the two 
stepped away from the cab, and Palmer asked defendant if he had 
any identification. Defendant responded that he did not, and 
Palmer asked him to look in his bag to see if he had anything 
with his name on it (Tr. 43, 52, 69-70, 85; FT. 8-9; PT. 2, 20). 
Defendant then turned and put his bag on a bench that was 
adjacent to the cab stand (Tr. 46, 70, 85-86; FT. 10; PT. 2, 20). 
As defendant bent over his bag to look through it, 
Fullmer noted that there was a "line" protruding through 
defendant's shirt (Tr. 70-1, 86; FT. 10). The line was above 
defendant's waist and spanned across his back (.Id.)- Although 
Fullmer testified that he "definitely didn't know exactly what it 
was," he was concerned that the line was tape which he had seen 
used on numerous occasions to strap narcotics to people's 
midsections (LdL). 
Palmer then told defendant that he was a narcotics 
agent and asked defendant if he was carrying any drugs. 
Defendant responded that he was not (Tr. 9, 98-99; PT. 2, 21). 
Palmer then asked defendant if he could search his bag, and 
defendant indicated that he could (Tr. 9, 26, 45-6, 71, 88-9; FT. 
10-11; PT. 2-3, 22). Palmer told the defendant that "it was 
strictly up to him," and that the defendant did not have to let 
him search his bag (Tr. 46, 65, 72, 88; PT. 3, 22). Defendant 
responded, "[y]es, you can," and handed his bag to Palmer (Id. 
4 
and Tr. 26). 
Palmer began to search defendant's bag. Fullmer 
testified that he then asked defendant if he "would mind" if 
Fullmer searched his person (Tr. 47, 64, 72; FT. 11; PT. 3). 
Defendant responded, "go ahead," and turned his back to Fullmer 
(Tr. 48, 72; FT. 11; PT. 3). Defendant testified, however, that 
Fullmer did not ask to search his person. According to 
defendant, Fullmer simply stated that he was going to search him, 
moved behind defendant and began a pat down search. Defendant 
further indicated that he did not say anything but just "went 
along with it" (Tr. 12-14, 27-8). 
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Although defendant testified that Palmer asked if he could 
search his bag and that he responded "Yes, you can," he also 
testified that he did not recall Palmer telling him that he did 
not have to allow him to search his bag (Tr. 26). Defendant 
further testified that Palmer "could have" told him, and that he 
was "not going to deny" that Palmer told him about his right to 
refuse consent (Id..). 
Fullmer conducted a pat down search of defendant and 
detected two bulges in defendant's lower abdomen area which later 
proved to be packages containing approximately 453 grams of 
cocaine (Tr. 73, 78; FT. 11-13)• According to Fullmer, after he 
completed the pat down search he pointed to defendant's abdomen 
where the bulges were and asked defendant what they were (Tr. 73-
4; FT. 13). Defendant did not respond, and Fullmer then asked if 
he could see the bulges (Tr. 74; FT. 13). Fullmer testified that 
defendant again did not respond verbally, and both officers 
testified that defendant then raised his shirt and revealed 
masking tape strapped around his midsection (Tr. 46-7, 74-5; FT. 
13-4; PT. 3). 
Fullmer still could not see the bulges, and asked 
defendant the purpose of the tape (Tr. 75; FT. 14). Defendant 
responded that he had injured his ribs and had taped them (Tr. 
15, 29, 75; FT. 14). The tape was well below defendant's ribs, 
started at his waistline and continued into his pants (Tr. 75; 
FT. 14-15; PT. 3). Fullmer testified that he then asked 
defendant if he could see the rest of the tape, and defendant 
responded that he could but said he would rather not do so in the 
public area of the terminal (Tr. 75; FT. 14-15). Fullmer said 
that their airport office was just inside the doors and suggested 
that they could go there if that was all right with defendant. 
Defendant said, "yes," and the three proceeded to the office (Tr. 
75; FT. 15). 
Palmer was just completing the search of defendant's 
bag when Fullmer informed him that they were going to the airport 
office (Tr. 48). According to defendant, Palmer's search of his 
bag took only "[t]hree, four minutes. Something like that. Not 
long at all" (Tr. 10-11). Fullmer's pat down search of defendant 
was initiated almost immediately after Palmer began searching 
defendant's bag and was completed shortly before Palmer was 
finished (Tr. 48, 72). 
Fullmer testified that, upon entering the airport 
office, he pointed to a seat and said to defendant "you can sit 
there if you like" (Tr. 77-8; FT. 17). According to both 
officers, defendant remained standing and said "you've got me, 
you might as well have this" (Tr. 77-8; FT. 17; PT. 24). 
Defendant then opened his pants to reveal the tape and two 
packages near his lower abdomen (Td. ) . Fullmer asked if there 
was cocaine in the packages, and defendant indicated that there 
was. Fullmer and defendant then removed the tape and packages. 
Fullmer tested the material and confirmed that it was cocaine 
(Tr. 78; FT. 17). 
Defendant was arrested and informed of his rights 
pursuant to Miranda (Tr. 79; FT. 17; PT. 24). According to 
Fullmer and Palmer, defendant then told them that he thought they 
were police when he got off the plane, and that was why he kept 
5 
looking back toward them (Tr. 50-1, 79; FT. 17; PT. 24). 
Defendant's testimony about how he was taken to the 
airport office differs somewhat from that of the officers. 
According to defendant, he simply did not respond to Fullmer's 
5 
Defendant testified that he made no such statement and that he 
did not know he was being followed until Palmer approached him 
near the taxi cab (Tr. 22-23). 
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requests to see the tape or bulges and never raised his shirt. 
He did, however, testify that he told Fullmer and Palmer that he 
had injured his ribs playing ball and had taped them. According 
to defendant's testimony, both officers laughed and told him they 
were going to their office. Defendant testified that once in the 
office Fullmer immediately grabbed his shirt and raised it to 
reveal the tape strapped to defendant's body (Tr. 14-15, 28-31). 
Defendant further testified that after the officers had seen the 
tape, Fullmer again asked what the bulge was and defendant said 
something to the effect of M[y]ou have got it," or "here it is," 
apparently in reference to the cocaine (Tr. 19, 31). 
In denying defendant's motion to suppress the cocaine 
seized, the trial court issued detailed written findings of fact 
and conclusions of law. (A copy of the district court's Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law is attached hereto as Addendum A). 
The trial court specifically found that "defendant freely and 
voluntarily consented to the police requests at least through the 
point of his voluntarily raising his shirt and disclosing to the 
police the masking tape that was bound around the trunk of his 
body" (R. 121). The court also found that the "tape was of the 
type not normally used for medical purposes and was located below 
the rib cage which was the area of injury indicated by defendant" 
(Id.). After noting that it had read transcripts of the 
officers' earlier depositions and had listened to the testimonies 
of both the officers and defendant, the trial court said it was 
"confident in crediting the testimony of the officers in this 
case" (R. 122). 
The court concluded that "defendant freely and 
voluntarily consented to everything that went on, at least 
through the point of voluntarily raising his shirt and disclosing 
to the police what was around the trunk of his body" (R. 123). 
The court also specifically concluded that "the pat down search 
[of defendant] was a free and voluntary consensual search" (Id.). 
Finally, the court concluded that defendant's lack of 
identification under the circumstances and his having non-medical 
type tape strapped around his abdomen for purported rib injuries, 
"gave rise to a reasonable articulable suspicion that the 
defendant was involved in crime, and therefore, from that point 
forward, law enforcement personnel were able to or had a right to 
interfere with the defendant's liberty" (R. 123-24). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court properly denied defendant's motion to 
suppress because the defendant knowingly and voluntarily 
consented to the search of his person and luggage. Further, 
defendant voluntarily raised his shirt and revealed to officers 
that he had non-medical masking tape wrapped around his waist for 
purported rib injuries. Defendant's lack of identification under 
the circumstances combined with his having masking tape wrapped 
around his waist gave rise to reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity and justified detention of defendant from that point 
forward. Moreover, defendant voluntarily produced the cocaine 
that was in his possession, and its subsequent seizure was 
legally justified. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE SEIZED BY THE 
POLICE BECAUSE DEFENDANT VOLUNTARILY 
CONSENTED TO THE SEARCH THAT YIELDED 
CONTRABAND UNTIL THE POLICE HAD A REASONABLE 
ARTICULABLE SUSPICION THAT DEFENDANT WAS 
INVOLVED IN A CRIME, AT WHICH TIME THE POLICE 
HAD THE RIGHT TO INTERFERE WITH DEFENDANT'S 
LIBERTY. 
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying 
his motion to suppress evidence. In reviewing the trial court's 
ruling, this Court applies the following standard: 
In considering the trial court's action in 
denying defendant's motion to suppress, we 
will not disturb its factual evaluation 
unless its findings are clearly erroneous. . 
. . The trial judge is in the best position 
to assess the credibility and accuracy of the 
witnesses' divergent testimonies. . . . 
However, in assessing the trial court's legal 
conclusions based upon its factual findings, 
we afford it no deference but apply a 
"correction of error" standard. 
State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 327 (Utah Ct. App.), cert. 
granted, P.2d (Utah 1989) (citations omitted). 
Defendant claims that his rights under the fourth and 
fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution and 
article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution were violated, 
arguing that the police did not have a reasonable and articulable 
suspicion to stop defendant and that defendant did not 
voluntarily consent to a search. 
Although defendant purports to base his claim on both federal 
and state constitutional grounds, he does not offer a specific 
independent state analysis. Rather, he merely makes a conclusory 
statement to the effect that "the Utah Supreme Court has 
abandoned 'tailgating' United States Supreme Court cases" and 
It is well settled that police officers may approach 
citizens and initiate a consensual encounter, and, as long as 
there is no detention or seizure, no fourth amendment rights are 
implicated, Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 (1983); State v. 
Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, (Utah 1987) State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 
85, (Utah Ct. App. 1987). While defendant acknowledges that 
police officers may initiate consensual encounters, he asserts 
that "what began as a 'consensual' encounter in the instant case 
quickly escalated into a fourth amendment detention or seizure" 
(Br. of App. at 8). The facts of this case and applicable case 
law do not support that assertion, and defendant's claim should 
be rejected. 
Cont. suggests that this Court's decision in State v. Sery, 
758 P.2d 935"(Utah Ct. App. 1988), should control this case (Br. 
of App. at 18 n.2). 
A mere assertion that a state and federal analysis might 
differ, without any elaboration, does not constitute a reasoned 
analysis. Defendant's state constitutional analysis below was 
even more cursory than that presented in his brief. This Court, 
therefore, should address defendant's claim based only on federal 
constitutional provisions. See, e.g., State v. Julian, 771 P.2d 
1061, 1062 n,l (Utah 1989); State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 883 
n.4 (Utah Ct. App.), petition for cert, filed, 135 Utah Adv. Rep. 
78 (Utah 1990) . 
Even if this Court were to consider defendant's state 
constitutional claim, defendant's reliance on Sery for his broad 
assertion is misplaced. Sery was not decided under state 
constitutional provisions, but under federal constitutional 
provisions. Furthermore, the aspect of Sery which defendant 
appears to argue is applicable to this case was based at least in 
part on the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in United 
States v. Sokolow, 831 F.2d 1413 (9th Cir. 1987). See Sery, 758 
P.2d at 943-44. The United States Supreme Court has since 
reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision in Sokolow. United States 
v. Sokolow, 109 S.Ct. 1581 (1989). Consequently, whether that 
portion of Sery upon which defendant seems to rely is still 
viable law is unclear. 
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Utah courts have recognized three levels of police 
encounters with the public: 
(1) an officer may approach a citizen at 
anytime [sic] and pose questions so long as 
the citizen is not detained against his will; 
(2) an officer may seize a person if the 
officer has an "articulable suspicion" that 
the person has committed or is about to 
commit a crime; however, the "detention must 
be temporary and last no longer than is 
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the 
stop"; 
(3) an officer may arrest a suspect if the 
officer has probable cause to believe an 
offense has been committed or is being 
committed. 
State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987) (quoting 
United States v. Merritt, 736 F.2d 223, 230 (5th Cir. 1984)). 
See also State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d at 328; State v. Smith, 781 
P.2d 879, 881 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Defendant mischaracterizes 
his encounter with officers Fullmer and Palmer as a "level two 
encounter" requiring "articulable suspicion" when it was in fact 
a consensual encounter, at least until the point at which the 
7 
officers and he moved to the airport office. In making his 
Defendant argues that even though he agreed to speak with 
Palmer, the encounter lost its consensual nature "when Palmer 
persisted in questioning him after he had been unable to produce 
his current ticket and had already provided a prior ticket" (Br. 
of App. at 11). Not only does defendant fail to cite any 
authority for this argument, but under level one consensual 
encounters, officers may "pose questions so long as the citizen 
is not detained against his will." Deitman, 739 P.2d at 617. 
Defendant also argues that "[c]onsensual type encounters 
clearly lose their voluntary nature when police begin searching" 
and appears to claim that once Palmer began searching defendant's 
bag defendant was seized (Br. of App. at 11). Defendant again 
fails to cite any authority for his per se argument, and the 
state is aware of none. More importantly, defendant's argument 
is the product of an inappropriate intermingling of the questions 
argument, defendant relies primarily on State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 
935 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), and Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 
(1983). However, Sery and Royer are significantly different from 
the instant case. 
In Sery, after the defendant refused to consent to a 
search of his bag, he was told he was free to leave, which he 
did. Detectives then gathered more information and again 
approached the defendant. When the defendant refused to submit 
his bag to a drug detection dog sniff, the officers detained him 
and seized his bag. The defendant was seized when he and his bag 
were taken back inside the airport terminal. This Court held 
that the officers lacked a reasonable suspicion to justify 
seizing and detaining defendant. Similarly, the defendant in 
Royer was seized when the detectives, without returning his 
ticket and driver's license, asked him to accompany them to a 
small room some 40 feet away. The seizure of the defendant was 
not justified because the detectives lacked reasonable suspicion 
that he was involved in criminal activity. In both Sery and 
Royer, the defendants' freedom of movement was clearly restricted 
by the actions of the officers even though the officers did not 
possess the requisite reasonable and articulable suspicion of 
criminal activity. 
The instant case presents a situation very different 
from Sery and Royer because, as the trial court found, defendant 
Cont. of whether consent was voluntary and whether defendant 
was seized; the two questions require distinct analysis. See, 
e.g., United States v. Maragh, 894 F.2d 415, 420 (D.C. Cir. 
1990). 
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freely and voluntarily consented to everything that occurred, at 
least until he voluntarily raised his shirt (R. 123). Numerous 
courts, when faced with police-citizen encounters similar to the 
encounter in the instant case, have found that defendants were 
not seized and fourth amendment protections were not triggered. 
See, e.g., United States v. Maragh, 894 F.2d 415 (D.C. Cir. 1990) 
(holding that defendant was not seized for fourth amendment 
purposes during encounter at train station in which officer 
approached defendant without blocking his path, while another 
officer stood behind defendant, and officer identified himself as 
a narcotics officer, asked defendant if he had drugs in his bag, 
and defendant allowed officer to search bag); United States v. 
Poitier, 818 F.2d 679, 682 (8th Cir. 1987) (holding that more was 
required to turn consensual questioning of passenger at airport 
into level two encounter than display of badges, request for 
information and suggestion that the parties move to a nearby area 
out of the flow of traffic). 
Moreover, defendant does not challenge any of the trial 
court's specific findings of fact, including the trial court's 
findings governing voluntary consent. For the purposes of legal 
analysis, the State and this Court must rely on the correctness 
of these findings of fact. Defendant, by rearguing his motion to 
suppress, is asking this Court to assume the trial bench and 
exercise a de novo review of the evidence presented at the 
hearing on that motion. That is not the function of the 
appellate process, and defendant's arguments must be rejected. 
Even if this Court were to exercise such a review, the law 
clearly supports the trial court's finding of voluntary consent. 
As the United States Supreme Court said in Schneckloth 
v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973), it is "well settled that one 
of the specifically established exceptions to the requirements of 
both a warrant and probable cause is a search that is conducted 
pursuant to [valid] consent." Ixi. at 219 (citations omitted). 
For consent to be valid it must be freely and voluntarily given. 
Id. at 222. This Court has likewise recognized the voluntary 
consent exception to fourth amendment requirements. See State v. 
Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 887 (Utah Ct. App,), petition for cert, 
filed, 135 Utah Adv. Rep. 78 (Utah 1990); State v. Sierra, 754 
P.2d 972, 980 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). To determine whether consent 
to search was voluntary, a totality of the circumstances test is 
applied to ensure that the consent was in fact voluntary and not 
the result of "duress or coercion, express or implied." 
Marshall, 791 P.2d at 887 (quoting Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227). 
The issue of whether a defendant voluntarily consented is a 
question of fact on which the state carries the burden of proof. 
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 557 (1980); 
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 222, 227. See also State v. Webb, 790 
P.2d 65, 87 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). This Court deferentially 
reviews trial court's finding that defendant's consent was 
voluntarily given and will not reverse absent clear error. Webb, 
790 P.2d at 87. 
While this Court has made clear that the state has the 
burden of demonstrating voluntary consent, it has not clearly 
specified what standard of proof applies to that burden. In 
State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d at 887-88, and State v. Webb, 790 
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P.2d at 82, the Court appears to have adopted a clear and 
convincing standard of proof by embracing the standard espoused 
in United States v. Abbott, 546 F.2d 883 (10th Cir. 1976). 
Quoting Abbott, the Marshall Court set out the following standard 
which must be met by the state "to sustain its burden to show 
that voluntary consent was given": 
(1) There must be clear and positive 
testimony that the consent was "unequivocal 
and specific" and "freely and intelligently 
given"; (2) the government must prove consent 
was given without duress or coercion, express 
or implied; and (3) the courts indulge every 
reasonable presumption against the waiver of 
fundamental constitutional rights and there 
must be convincing evidence that such rights 
were waived. 
791 P.2d at 887-88 (quoting Abbott, 546 F.2d at 885 (quoting 
Villano v. United States, 310 F.2d 680, 684 (10th Cir. 1962)). 
This standard has been questioned by at least one other court as 
being an unduly strict standard of proof. United States v. -
Miller, 589 F.2d 1117, 1130-31 (1st Cir. 1978), cert, denied, 440 
U.S. 958 (1979). Indeed, insofar as the Abbott standard imposes 
a clear and convincing standard of proof on the government, it is 
contrary to the clear majority view that the government need only 
prove voluntary consent to search by a preponderance of the 
evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 177 
n.14 (1974) (where, in reviewing the voluntariness of a consent 
to a warrantless search, the Court said the "controlling burden 
of proof at suppression hearings should impose no greater burden 
than proof by a preponderance of the evidence"); Bourjaily v. 
United States, 483 U.S. 171, 176 (1987) (citing Matlock for the 
principle that "voluntariness of consent to search must be shown 
by a preponderance of the evidence"); United States v. Hurtado, 
905 F.2d 74 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v. Chaidez, 906 F.2d 
377 (8th Cir. 1990); White Fabricating Company v. United States, 
903 F.2d 404 (6th Cir. 1990); People v. Harris, 557 N.E.2d 1277 
(111. App. 1990); State v. Cross, 576 A.2d 1366 (Me. 1990); State 
v. O'Dell, 576 A.2d 425 (R.I. 1990); People v. Henderson, 220 
Cal.App.3d 1632f 270 Cal.Rptr. 248 (1990). 
While acceptance of the preponderance standard in this 
context is not universal, see 4 LaFavef Search and Seizure, 
§ 11.2(c) at 236-37 (1987), the United States Supreme Court has 
made clear that that standard is appropriate, thus explaining the 
majority view. As the Fifth Circuit said in overruling its prior 
decisions that adopted a clear and convincing standard of proof: 
Since 1972, the Supreme Court has stated 
that the preponderance of evidence standard 
supplies the burden which the government must 
carry to defeat a defendant's motion to 
suppress evidence when the motion concerns 
the voluntariness of a confession, Lego v. 
Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 482-89, 92 S.Ct. 619, 
623-26, 30 L.Ed.2d 618 (1972), the 
voluntariness of a consent to a warrantless 
search, United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 
164, 177 n. 14, 94 S.Ct. 988, 996 n. 14, 39 
L.Ed.2d 242 (1974), the inevitable discovery 
of evidence, Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 
444 n. 5, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 2509 n. 5, 81 
L.Ed.2d 377 (1984), or the waiver of Miranda 
rights, Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 
107 S.Ct. 515, 523, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986). 
In conformity with the rationale announced 
by the Supreme Court, we overrule our 
previous decisions requiring the government 
at a suppression hearing to prove 
voluntariness [of consent to search] by clear 
and convincing evidence. "[TJhe controlling 
burden of proof at suppression hearings 
should impose no greater burden than proof by 
a preponderance of the evidence." United 
States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 177 n. 14, 
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94 S.Ct. 988, 996 n. 14, 39 L.Ed.2d 242 
(1974). 
United States v. Hurtado# 905 F.2d at 76. In Lego v. Twomey, the 
Supreme Court explained its rationale for the preponderance 
standard: 
Since the purpose that a voluntariness 
hearing is designed to serve has nothing 
whatever to do with improving the reliability 
of jury verdicts, we cannot accept the charge 
that judging the admissibility of a 
confession by a preponderance of the evidence 
undermines the mandate of In re Winship, 397 
U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 
(1970). Our decision in Winship was not 
concerned with the standards for determining 
the admissibility of evidence or with the 
prosecution's burden of proof at a 
suppression hearing when evidence is 
challenged on constitutional grounds. 
Winship went no further than to confirm the 
fundamental right that protects "the accused 
against conviction except upon proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to 
constitute the crime with which he is 
charged." Id. at 364, 90 S.Ct., at 1072. . . 
. A guilty verdict is not rendered less 
reliable or less consonant with Winship 
simply because the admissibility of a 
confession is determined by a less stringent 
standard. . . . 
404 U.S. at 486-87. The Court also rejected the argument that 
the admissibility of evidence challenged on constitutional 
grounds should be determined under a stricter standard of proof 
in order to protect the values that exclusionary rules are 
designed to protect: 
The argument is straightforward and has 
appeal. But we are unconvinced that merely 
emphasizing the importance of the values 
served by exclusionary rules is itself 
sufficient demonstration that the 
Constitution also requires admissibility to 
be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment has been excluded from federal 
criminal trials for years. The same is true 
of coerced confessions offered in federal or 
state trials. But, from our experience over 
this period of time no substantial evidence 
has accumulated that federal rights have 
suffered from determining admissibility by a 
preponderance of the evidence. . . . Without 
good cause, we are unwilling to expand 
currently applicable exclusionary rules by 
erecting additional barriers to placing 
truthful and probative evidence before state 
juries . . . . Sound reason for moving 
further in this direction has not been 
offered here nor do we discern any at the 
present time. This is particularly true 
since the exclusionary rules are very much 
aimed at deterring lawless conduct by the 
police and prosecution and it is very 
doubtful that escalating the prosecution's 
burden of proof in Fourth and Fifth Amendment 
suppression hearings would be sufficiently 
productive in this respect to outweigh the 
public interest in placing probative evidence 
before juries for the purpose of arriving at 
truthful decisions about guilt or innocence. 
404 U.S. at 488-89 (citations and footnote omitted). Although 
the Court said that "the States are free,pursuant to their own 
law, to adopt a higher standardf,] [in that] [t]hey may indeed 
differ as to the appropriate resolution of the values they find 
at stake," Ld* at 489, the rationale of Lego v. Twomey is sound 
and should provide the basis for this Court clearly specifying 
that the state need only prove voluntary consent to search by a 
preponderance of the evidence. 
Defendant claims that his consent could not have been 
voluntary because it was not "unequivocal and specific" (Br. of 
App. at 23). As a brief review of the record will demonstrate, 
that assertion is utterly meritless. 
Palmer identified himself as a narcotics officer before 
he asked defendant if he could search his bag. When defendant 
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responded that he could, Palmer emphasized that it was strictly 
up to defendant to allow him to search his bag (Tr. 46, 65, 72, 
88; PT. 3, 22). Defendant again responded affirmatively and 
handed his bag to Palmer (3x1. and Tr, 26). Just as Palmer began 
to search defendant's bag, Fullmer asked defendant if he could 
search his person. Defendant responded, "go ahead," and turned 
his back to Fullmer (Tr. 48, 72; FT. 11; PT. 3). The trial court 
found that defendant voluntarily raised his shirt to reveal the 
masking tape wrapped around the trunk of his body (R. 121, 123). 
All of those events occurred in a public area of the 
airport, and only a few minutes elapsed. Neither officer asked 
defendant to move to an isolated area of the airport or to their 
office. Indeed, it was defendant who asked if they could move 
out of the public eye (Tr. 75; FT. 14-15). Fullmer suggested 
that their office was nearby, and defendant agreed that that 
location would be suitable (Tr. 75; PT 15). After the three 
entered the office, defendant volunteered that he was carrying 
narcotics and admitted that the packages strapped to his abdomen 
contained cocaine (Tr. 77-8; FT. 17; PT. 24). Defendant even 
assisted Fullmer in removing the tape and packages from his 
midsection (Tr. 77-8; FT. 17; PT.24). 
The evidence clearly supports the trial court's finding 
of voluntary consent to search by a preponderance of the 
evidence. Even if this Court chooses to apply the stiffer 
Marshall standard, it is difficult to imagine how defendant's 
consent to search could have been more "unequivocal and 
specific". Moreover, defendant does not allege that his consent 
was the product of duress or coercion. Therefore, discussion of 
the second prong of the Marshall analysis is unnecessary. 
Considering the totality of circumstances, there can be little 
doubt that defendant's consent was valid, at least through the 
point of his raising his shirt. See, e.g., Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 
at 555-60 (consent to search obtained after defendant had 
accompanied officers to an office away from the public eye and 
defendant had expressed concern that she would miss her plane was 
held valid); United States v. Bell, 892 F.2d 959, 965-66 (10th 
Cir. 1989) (finding consent valid under totality of circumstances 
with facts very similar to the instant case). See also State v. 
Webb, 790 P.2d at 82-3 (holding that even though defendant had 
already been arrested at time consent to search was given, under 
the totality of circumstances test consent was valid). 
At the time defendant raised his shirt, the cumulative 
effect of three factors gave rise to a reasonable articulable 
suspicion that defendant was committing a crime: (1) defendant's 
lack of identification under the circumstances; (2) the fact that 
defendant indicated that the masking tape wrapped around his body 
was for rib injuries; and (3) the observation of the police 
officers that the tape was located below defendant's rib cage and 
was not of the type normally used for medical reasons (R. 123). 
All three factors were known to the officers before they 
accompanied defendant to the airport office. Consequently, even 
if the encounter between the officers and defendant escalated to 
a level two encounter when it was decided to move to an office 
inside the airport terminal, the officers were justified in 
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detaining defendant from that point forward, Deitman, 739 P.2d 
at 617-18. The record clearly supports the trial court's finding 
to that effect (R. 123-24). 
Finally, defendant asserts that State v. Arroyo, 796 
P.2d 684 (Utah 1990), is applicable to this case. Arroyo applies 
to those cases in which consent is given after there has been 
some police misconduct which might have tainted the validity of 
that consent. It is intended to prevent law enforcement 
officials from exploiting their prior illegalities to obtain 
consent. In the instant case, there was no illegality on the 
part of police before defendant consented to the search of his 
person and bag. Consequently, Arroyo does not apply to this 
case, and defendant's reliance on it is misplaced. 
The encounter between police and defendant was 
consensual, at least until defendant raised his shirt to reveal 
the masking tape strapped around his body. From that point 
forward, the officers had a right to detain defendant. The trial 
court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's conviction 
should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this * day of November, 1990. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
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Assistant Attorney General 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v, 
RODNEY DONALD CARTER, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 891901201 
Honorable Michael R. Murphy 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing 
before the Honorable Michael R. Murphy on the 11th day of December, 
1989. The State of Utah was represented by its attorney, GREGORY 
M. WARNER, Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney, and the defendant was 
present and represented by his counsel, RONALD J. YENGICH, 
ESQUIRE. The Court having duly considered the evidence and 
testimony presented by the parties together with the party's 
argument thereon, now makes and enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The defendant deplaned from an airline which the 
police considered to be from an area of origin where drugs were 
considered available. 
2. As the defendant deplaned, he scanned the crowd. 
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3. As the defendant proceeded down the corridor, he 
looked back at least three times. 
4. The defendant went to a phone bank which was not 
the first phone bank available, but was the second phone bank 
available. 
5. As the defendant was at the phone bank, he looked 
away from the police officer who had gone to the telephone next to 
the one the defendant was using, and it is the Court's finding that 
the officers involved had no ability to actually perceive what the 
defendant was doing. 
6. The defendant next proceeded toward the exit of the 
airport and walked fast down an J^L-evator^  rsTpner than remaining 
stationary. 
7. The defendant was carrying a type of a duffle bag 
which appeared to be empty. 
8. The defendant did not have checked bags. 
9. The defendant proceeded directly to a cab stand and 
hailed a cab. 
10. The defendant approached the taxi. He had engaged 
the taxi, had placed his bag into the back seat and was contacted 
by an officer who told him he was a police officer, and asked the 
defendant if he would speak with him. 
11. The defendant was asked to talk to the officer in a 
location approximately 20 feet from the taxi, at which point the 
officers began to ask the defendant questions. 
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12. The defendant was asked for identification by law 
enforcement personnel and the defendant was unable to produce 
identification. 
13. The defendant's duffle bag was searched and an 
airline ticket used on a previous flight in the name of Warren 
Carter was revealed. 
14. Officer Fullmer detected a line just at or above 
the defendant's waist but under his outer clothing, but was unable 
to determine what material caused such line on the defendant's 
clothing. 
15. A pat down search was conducted by Officer Fullmer 
of the defendant and a bulge or bulges was found on the defendant 
at the time of such pat down. 
16. The defendant lifted his shirt and exposed masking 
tape which extended down into his pants and which the defendant 
indicated to the law enforcement personnel was for medical purposes. 
17. The defendant was returning from Nevada and had 
just a day or so before gone from Salt Lake to Las Vegas, which he 
demonstrated by the ticket stub that was produced by the defendant. 
18. The defendant freely and voluntarily raised his 
shirt exposing the masking tape strapped around his body and the 
Court finds that the defendant freely and voluntarily consented to 
the police requests at least through the point of his voluntarily 
raising his shirt and disclosing to the police the masking^t^ypa ^  -
that was bound around the trunk of his body. IMC L*~j%^ (*/-*•*- **j c/^ 
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19. The Court's determination of the facts was not a 
matter of the Court perfunctorily accepting the testimony of the 
police officers. The Court listened to both officers testimony and 
the testimony of the defendant, and after further reading the 
Transcript in lieu of a preliminary hearing previously submitted by 
counsel for the purpose of the hearing, the Court feels confident 
in crediting the testimony of the officers in this case. 
WHEREFORE, having heretofore entered its Findings of 
Fact, the Court now makes and enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court specifically discredits the officers 
ability to form a reasonable articulate suspicion prior to the time 
of the defendant's failure to provide an identification upon 
request. 
2. The Court concludes that the absence or the failure 
of the defendant to produce identification also was not by itself, 
or in the aggregate with the previously listed factors, sufficient 
to indicate a reasonable articulable suspicion. 
3. The Court further concludes that the officer 
perception of a line just at or above the defendant's waist, but 
under his outer clothing, was not a reasonable articulable 
suspicion by itself or in combination with anything previously 
noted. 
4. The Court further concludes that the pat down 
search and observations made by the officers, including the feeling 
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of the bulge, at that time was not sufficient to constitute a 
reasonable suspicion either alone or in the aggregate. 
5. The Court gives no weight individually or in the 
aggregate to those factors other than the lack of identification in 
conjunction with the lifting of the defendant's shirt: and his 
explanation as to the tape on his body. 
6. The Court concludes, however, that the defendant 
freely and voluntarily consented to everything that went on, at 
least through the point of voluntarily raising his shirt and 
disclosing to the police what was around the trunk of his body and 
further that the pat down search was a free and voluntary 
consensual search. 
7. The Court concludes that a combination of the 
defendant's lack of identification under the circumstances where he 
was at the airport returning from Nevada and had just a day or so 
gone from Salt Lake to Las Vegas, which was demonstrated 
voluntarily by the ticket stub that was produced by the defendant, 
and in combination with the defendant freely and voluntarily 
raising his shirt wherein the defendant stated that what was 
strapped around his body was merely for medical purposes, and the 
observation of the police at that time that the taping was other 
than what is normally used in medical settings, and the fact that 
the taping was below the rib cage, gave rise to reasonable 
articulable suspicion that the defendant was involved in crime, and 
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therefore, from that point forward, law enforcement personnel were 
able to or had a right to interfere with the defendant's liberty. 
, 4-7%) 
DATED this/ ' day of January, 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
HONORABLE MICHAEL R. MURPHY 
Third District Court Judge 
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